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<text id=94TT1729>
<title>
Dec. 12, 1994: Bosnia:Allied in Failure
</title>
<history>
TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1994
Dec. 12, 1994 To the Dogs
</history>
<article>
<source>Time Magazine</source>
<hdr>
BOSNIA, Page 28
Allied in Failure
</hdr>
<body>
<p> Western impotence over Bihac is the culmination of two years
of ineffectual wrangling among Washington, its European partners
and the U.N.
</p>
<p>By James Walsh--Reported by Jay Branegan/Brussels, James L. Graff/Vienna, J.F.O.
McAllister/Washington, and Alexandra Stiglmayer/Zagreb, with
other bureaus
</p>
<p> The tables were spread in Brussels last week for a grand conclave
charting the future of NATO. Foreign ministers representing
the 16 partners in one of history's strongest, most successful
alliances arrived with words intended to reaffirm its solidarity,
even as the war in Bosnia was testing its inner strength. The
mantra of the hour was articulated by Warren Christopher, who
came armed with a freshly retuned U.S. policy toward a corner
of Europe that has defied Western peacemaking efforts. Declared
the U.S. Secretary of State: "The crisis in Bosnia is about
Bosnia, not about NATO."
</p>
<p> But how to believe Western credibility is alive and well, despite
all evidence to the contrary--despite feckless diplomacy,
a chain of broken promises and empty threats, mounting rancor
among the allies and a record on Bosnia so altogether contradictory
as to very nearly beggar understanding? What really stood out
in red on the Brussels agenda was the unsettling truth that
the crisis is about not only Bosnia but also that much vaunted
chimera, the new world order.
</p>
<p> The emergency concerns not just NATO but also the U.N. and other
instruments through which the U.S. and the West's other powers
have sought to enforce peace and deter aggression. In practice,
if the "international community" means anything, it denotes
the U.S. in tandem with Britain and France. Russia must be consulted,
Germany and Japan write occasional checks, and China's nonobstruction
is sometimes needed; but Washington, London and Paris are the
governments that count.
</p>
<p> In suffering Bosnia, the first test case of cohesion following
the Soviet Union's collapse, the great powers have certifiably
failed. Western impotence last week in the face of the Serb
assault on Bihac was the culmination of more than two years
of ineffectual wrangling among Washington, its European partners
and the U.N. over how the horrible ethnic conflict could be
stopped. Now, as the fighting worsens again, none of the peacemaking
institutions so grandly charged with keeping the post-cold war
world order has the vision or unity to impose a policy.
</p>
<p> Indeed much of the diplomatic discussion last week focused on
ways to bail out: how to withdraw the 24,000 U.N. peacekeepers
should the need arise quickly, an undertaking that could pose
appalling dangers. Extreme contingencies call for the troops
to abandon equipment and dash for helicopters or the coast,
shooting their way out if necessary. Already as of late last
week, 360 soldiers of the U.N. "protective" force, which sometimes
seems to need more protection than it delivers, were being held
virtual hostages by Serb forces; their numbers could grow if
a pullout were ordered.
</p>
<p> Lost amid the recriminations was a firm grasp of how the order
of battle in Bosnia really stands. Have the Serbs won, as Defense
Secretary William Perry pronounced on television early last
week? He wrote off the Bosnian government's hopes of regaining
turf. Yet even if the town of Bihac should fall, and assuming
continued supplies of food, fuel and medicine from outside,
the defenders of Bosnian sovereignty are actually better prepared
than ever to fight for their homeland against the viciousness
of tribal aggrandizement.
</p>
<p> Other remote Muslim enclaves would be vulnerable if fighting
escalated, but Serb forces in the Bosnian republic have dwindled
through desertion. According to best estimates, only about 80,000
Serb fighters remain active in the republic, but they lack sufficient
fuel and are stretched thin. Though they outgun the Bosnian
army 6 to 1 in heavy weapons, Sarajevo's infantry has an edge
in manpower and a mobility advantage over tanks and artillery
in winter. The Bosnian army has a chance of holding its own
and even of advancing--which is probably a major reason why
Serb commanders undertook to invade Bihac. At the practical
level, the strategy was to take land needed to open a rail link
between their forces and kindred units holding territory across
the border in Croatia--a prospect that prompted the Croatian
government to threaten intervention. Beyond that, the unpunished
siege of Bihac could and did shatter Western resolve.
</p>
<p> Last week the Clinton Administration sought to patch up its
differences with the Europeans by putting a stronger accent
on negotiating with the militant Serbs. The fresh angle was
evidently--but for the record, not explicitly--a further
sop to the aggressors, if only they would cease further killing.
That prospective inducement looked very much like a prize that
the U.S., particularly since Clinton became President, has sought
expressly to deny the "ethnic cleansers": formation of a Greater
Serbia between the rump Yugoslav state and the Serbs in breakaway
Bosnia and Croatia. Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary,
and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe were to visit Belgrade
this week to consult on the initiative with Slobodan Milosevic,
Serbia's nationalistic President.
</p>
<p> In official circles, Western Europe was delighted at Washington's
apparent decision to drop the calls for bombing the Serbs that
had so riled Paris and London. Some news accounts crowed that
the turnabout marked Europe's first success in calling the tune
on a major alliance policy. But how successful is the European
line? U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali got a faceful
of answers last week as he flew into Sarajevo demanding cease-fires.
He left empty-handed amid jeers and snubs, underscoring how
low the U.N. stands in Bosnian public opinion. Radovan Karadzic,
head of the rebel Serb "republic" that occupies 70% of Bosnian
territory, refused to meet on the neutral ground of Sarajevo's
airport, insisting that Boutros-Ghali come to see him. Boutros-Ghali
declined.
</p>
<p> Even as NATO's pep rally began in earnest in Brussels, it was
treated to a shower of ice water from Russian Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev, who set the meeting back on its heels by suddenly
refusing a long-prepared deal offering Moscow a special relationship
with NATO in coordinating European security. Kozyrev's rebuff
might have been meant to fend off nationalists at home, but
its timing suggested that lessons from the Bosnia debacle were
taken into account.
</p>
<p> After shifting its position back and forth on NATO's future
now that it no longer has an enemy, the Clinton Administration
now seems to be leaning toward a more rapid enlargement of the
alliance right up to Russia's doorstep, incorporating Poland,
Hungary and other edgy former Soviet satellites. Clinton was
to travel to Budapest last weekend to cement the pledge of good
faith toward these candidate front-line states, but Moscow was
not snapping up a separate compact designed to keep mistrustful
Russians mollified. Not only was Kozyrev miffed that Christopher
was floating the idea of another international conference on
Bosnia without consulting the Kremlin, but as long as the West
could not sort out whether it wanted to punish or reward aggression,
expanding the alliance's frontiers seemed beside the point.
</p>
<p> Martin McCusker, director of the Defense and Security Committee
of the North Atlantic Assembly, NATO's parliamentary wing, blamed
the divisions on "the shambolic command-and-control operation"
in Bosnia, under which the alliance supplies the military muscle
but the ever cautious U.N. calls the shots. The point, however,
is that the same nations that control NATO also control the
U.N. Security Council. Out of one side of their mouths, Britain
and France have said they want authority to strike at Serbs
attacking "safe areas"; out of the other, they veto the idea,
or limit targets to unmanned tanks or empty runways.
</p>
<p> The failure to hit at the Serbs besieging Bihac finally exposed
the threats as hollow. Said Jean-Francois Deniau, a centrist
French parliamentarian and critic of Western policy: "Today
all rules and references have been wiped out. The U.N. has been
discredited, Europe has been discredited, and NATO has been
discredited. Forget all these defeated institutions and failed
solutions. We're going to have to come up with a new approach."
The trouble is, new approaches with any grit are all but ruled
out by the old one, which has consisted mainly of keeping the
conflict off the front pages and providing the Western powers
a fig leaf of respectability.
</p>
<p> The U.S., which ordinarily exercises the crucial leadership
in such affairs, has fumbled on Clinton's watch. After demands
by presidential candidate Clinton for an ironfisted approach
toward the Serbs, the Administration proceeded to soft-sell
the strategy among NATO allies. When Serbs continued to shell
and "cleanse" Muslims out of their homes, the alliance belatedly
declared "safe areas," to be protected by air strikes and other
military measures--but then rarely ordered them. The only
time military threats worked was around Sarajevo last February
after a horrifying Serb bombardment of the capital's marketplace
outraged world opinion to such a degree that for once it seemed
retribution would be forthcoming. The subsequently created "total
exclusion zone" for heavy weapons afforded Sarajevo a welcome
semblance of peace for several months that is now beginning
to fray dangerously.
</p>
<p> Last week the Western front was roiling just about everywhere.
As Christopher was peddling a revamped approach before NATO,
Bob Dole was winding up visits to London and Brussels during
which he called for an end to the arms embargo against the Bosnians.
The man who will soon become the Republican majority leader
in the U.S. Senate was given short shrift in Britain, where
Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind termed American criticisms
of British policy "disgraceful" and demanded that Washington
remain silent if it would not send troops to Bosnia.
</p>
<p> Dole, displaying what he surely hoped would be regarded as presidential
stuff, said he was unconvinced that reprisals against the Serbs
could not work. "I want to express my strong support for a strong
NATO," he stressed in Brussels. Yet he still planned to introduce
an embargo-lifting resolution in the Senate, perhaps tacked
to a veto-proof spending bill, sometime after the new Congress
convenes in January. He predicted at least 70 to 80 votes in
favor.
</p>
<p> The rough treatment that Republicans could dish out to what
remains of the new world order visibly worries the Europeans.
At the least, the Republican-controlled Congress may try to
gut the U.N. peacekeeping budget, in light of the Balkan experience.
Dissension was not afflicting the U.S. alone though. In Germany
the Suddeutsche Zeitung last week put on its front page a classified
wire sent to Bonn by the German ambassador to NATO, Hermann
von Richthofen, a grandnephew of the World War I flying ace
known as the Red Baron. His complaints centered on what he styled
an arbitrary U.S. push to expand NATO eastward rapidly and to
lift the arms embargo on Bosnia, which he said would strain
the alliance "to the limits."
</p>
<p> A strange wire indeed. The German government, or at least the
Defense Ministry, has been an agitator on behalf of faster NATO
enlargement. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's own Christian Democratic
Union, meeting in a party congress last week, passed a resolution
recognizing that the Bosnia embargo may have to be lifted. Kohl
personally endorsed the measure, saying failure to protect Muslim
sanctuaries was a "disgrace." Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel
said Germany "stands morally close to the American position."
In practical terms, however, it stands apart.
</p>
<p> The reason is those allied ground troops deployed under U.N.
command. Britain and France both have sizable contingents in
Bosnia, and they have waved the dangers to these soldiers every
time a punitive action against the Serbs is mentioned. Yet the
infantry forces were inserted in the first place under impossible
conditions that limit them to little more than glorified Red
Cross work. The humanitarian mission remains vital, but the
troops also provide an excuse for not using air power and other
forceful measures.
</p>
<p> In New York last week, Kofi Annan, the U.N. Under Secretary
for Peacekeeping, bridled at the charges of U.N. do-nothingness.
"I believe the United Nations has been made a scapegoat," he
charged, by "member states who do not want to take the risks."
An official at NATO headquarters summed up U.S. frustrations:
"It's because the Europeans say one thing in New York and something
different here."
</p>
<p> The double-bluff approach has worked precisely because Europeans,
along with Americans, flinch at the thought of risking a single
one of their soldiers in confronting such an ugly, inscrutable
and remote enemy. The allies have all sought to dodge the question
and posture. Margaret Thatcher was one Briton who would probably
have asked for support and perhaps won it.
</p>
<p> Offering comfort to Dole last week, the former British Prime
Minister and co-architect of the war against Iraq said, "Did
you ever hear of anything so absurd as to go after the runway
but not the aircraft? I must say on the whole, my method of
tackling aggression was quite a good one." In a Daily Mail commentary
excoriating Hurd, defense analyst and Oxford historian Mark
Almond concluded, "Whitehall's indignation at American criticism
is all the more heated because it masks a bad conscience." His
view was echoed in Washington by a similar criticism of Clinton,
who has kept the dispute at arm's length and did not even attend
last week's policy review. A former Administration official
said, "Bill Clinton was not able to lead the Western alliance.
Did he try? Who cares? He struck out." The ashes of the policy
are being tasted in Bihac, but they have soiled every corner
of the new world order.
</p></body>
</article>
</text>